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BAD NEWS SHOULD TRAVEL FAST: 
HOT CHECKS, TARDY BANKS, AND THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S 
RUDE SURPRISE 
The bottom line is a bank's relationship with its customer is built 
on trust 
-Charlotte Birch, Spokesperson for the American Bankers 
Association, quoted in the New York Times, 
October 25, 1999.1 
[Article 4 of the u.c.c.] was drafted entirely with the purpose of 
protecting the banks so that they could carryon their business at 
the risk of the customer. 
-Frederick K. Beutel, untrusting law professor. in the 
Yale Law Journal, 1952.2 
1. 
INTRoDucrroN 
Each day the check collection system processes approximately 174 mil-
lion checks,3 many of which are payable to consumers4 who trustinglyS de-
posit them in their bank accounts and soon spend the deposited funds on 
,~ Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. For their 
critical comments on an earlier draft I thank Russell Hakes. Gail Hillebrand. Donald 
Rapson, and Edward Rubin. Their generosity in reading and commenting on this article in 
no way makes them liable for its content, for which I alone bear the blame. lowe much to 
Mae Kuykendall and Robert C. Rich for their conversations and clever turns of phrase. 
1. Charlotte Birch, quoted ill Jeri Clausing. Re~'ised Banking Legislation Raises Con-
cerns About Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999. at Cl. 
2. Frederick K. Beutel. The Proposed Ullifoml [?l Commercial Code Sizoulcl Not Be 
Adoptetl, 61 YALE LJ. 334, 361 (1952). 
3. Eileen Canning, Conswner Group Scores Banking Illdustry for Col/ecting Billiolls 
from Bounced Checks, BANKING DAILY (BNA). June 30, 1998. ami/able in LEXIS. BNA 
Library, BNABD file. Presumably, this figure excludes nonbanking days. 
4. Federal legislation broadly defines a consumer as a natural person. See, e.g., Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(5) (1994). 
5. However, not much trust has been demonstrated lately by vocal opponents of the 
1999 Gramm-Leach Act and critics of high ATM fees. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhom. 
Council Seeks to Ban A.T.M. Fees for NOllcustomers. N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 16. 1999. at Bl 
(describing how New York City, like San Francisco and Santa Monica. moved to prohibit 
banks from charging ATM fees to noncustomers); Molly Ivins. Friends. Prepare for Bank 
Bill Hel~ DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 31, 1999. at 5F ("The inevitable result \\ill be a wave of 
mergers creating gigantic financial entities ..•• When was the last time you saw a vast con-
centration of wealth and power that didn't create abuses?"). 
539 
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goods and services, necessities, and luxuries. From a consumer's perspec-
tive, the check collection system usually works well. Indeed, less than one 
percent of checks are dishonored.6 In absolute numbers, however, dishon-
ored checks exceed one million daily. 
Not long ago, I was told a disturbing story about one of these dishon-
ored checks: 
A babysitter visited a low-income legal clinic asking for help. 
She had deposited her last paycheck from a long-term job in her 
checking account and had soon gained access to the deposit, 
which she used for various living expenses. Several months later, 
the babysitter's bank notified her that the deposited check had 
bounced and that her account had been charged for the amount of 
the check. Because she had no cushion of extra funds to cover 
this charge, outstanding checks the babysitter had drawn against 
her account would soon bounce. Upset and frightened, she 
turned to a legal clinic intern. 
"Can the bank charge the babysitter's account so long after 
the deposit?" the student intern asked me. "Even after she spent 
the account balance?" 
"Yes," I said, unhappily. 
Through a process termed charge-back,7 Article 4 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code8 ("U.c.c." or "Code") authorizes a depository bank to 
charge its depositor's account in the amount of a dishonored check, with-
out regard to the length of time since the deposit.9 No matter that the 
check might have been paid if processed promptly. Too bad for the con-
sumer who weeks or months earlier relied on her access to the deposit and 
on her bank's failure to notify her that the deposited check was drawn on 
insufficient funds. Too bad that the depositor now faces an overdraft or a 
credit card bill she cannot pay. Too bad that new checks already drawn 
6. Canning, supra note 3. 
7. Section 4-214(a) provides in pertinent part: 
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its customer for an item 
and fails by reason of dishonor ... to receive settlement for the item which is or 
becomes final, the bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge back the 
amount of any credit given for the item to its customer's account or obtain refund 
from its customer . . .. 
U.e.e. § 4-214(a) (1996) (emphasis added). This section gives the depository bank three 
options: (1) revoke provisional credit, (2) charge back against an account balance, or (3) 
obtain a refund. Id. While, strictly speaking, the first case involves a revocation and the 
second case a charge-back, this technical distinction makes little difference to the depositor 
who in both cases loses access to an account balance. For this reason and for convenience, 
the bank's self-help right against its depositor in both of these cases is termed herein a 
charge-back right. 
8. Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, applies to checks and is supplemented by 
Article 3, which applies to negotiable instruments generally. U.C.e. §§ 4-102(a), 3-102(a), 
(b). 
9. U.e.e. § 4-214(a). 
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against her account will soon bounce because a surprise charge-back has 
reduced or wiped out her account balance.Io Even where it is readily ap-
parent that one or more banks has mishandled a check. Article 4 authorizes 
a bank to engage in self-help to shift loss to its depositor when a check 
bounces. The depositor's recourse is to initiate litigation against her bank 
to establish that bank delay and perhaps negligence caused her a loss. Such 
litigation is an expensive proposition for any customer and one that is 
likely to be prohibitive for a consumer whose resources are vastly inferior 
to those of a bank.ll In the ordinary case, loss will thus remain with the 
consumer even where bank misbehavior caused the IOSS.12 
Commercial depositors have challenged this tardy charge-back rule. 
sometimes successfullyP Their victories, however. were won under a pre-
1990 version of Article 4, which some sympathetic courts interpreted to 
condition charge-back on timeliness.14 The language of revised Article 4 
expressly protects a tardy bank's right to charge-back. IS 
Although consumers may be less able than commercial depositors to 
bear the costs of tardy charge-back, consumers are even less likely to chal-
lenge it. A consumer's typical inability to bear litigation costs. together 
,vith the small amount of many consumer checks relative to those costs 
10. The Consumer Federation of America complains that banks collect S5.6 billion an-
nually from consumers in bounced check fees, an amount "11 to 32 times more than what it 
costs to process bounced checks." Banks collect another $1.1 billion for returning deposited 
checks, an amount that is "9 to 11 times what it costs to process deposited checks that 
bounce." Canning, supra note 3, citing CoNSUMER FED'N OF hi., Bout-OCED CHECKS: BIL. 
UON DOLLAR PROFITS II (1998). Gail Hillebrand has urged state legislators to protect 
consumers by enacting dollar caps on not sufficient funds (NSF) fees. Gail K. Hillebrand, 
Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Unifoml Commercial Code: A Consumer Perspect;w!, 42 
ALA. L. REv. 679, 716 (1991). 
11. Professor Edward Rubin has identified "initiation" as a cost of the U.C.C:s private 
enforcement scheme particularly burdensome to consumers. Edward L. Rubin, Tlte Code, 
the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. u. LQ. 11, 
21-24 (1997). 
12. So one-sided is the bank's tardy charge-back right that if it were the product of 
contract rather than statute, it might well be stricken as unconscionable. For a much-cited 
application of the doctrine of unconscionability, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) which e>'l'lains that "[u]nconscionabiIity has generally 
been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." /d. at 
449. 
13. See, e.g., Zimmer v. Independence Say. Bank, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 2d 891 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1996) (charge-back improper si.x months after deposit under pre-1990 version of 
Article 4); Smallman v. Home Fed. Say. Bank of Tenn., 786 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn. App. 1989) 
(charge-back improper four months after deposit and five weeks after depository bank re-
ceived notice of nonpayment); Erst Sec. Bank of Utah V. Lundahl. 454 P.2d SS6 (Utah 1969) 
(charge-back improper more than two months after deposit). BIlt see Appliance Buyers 
Credit Corp. v. Prospect Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 708 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1983) (untimely 
charge-back does not entitle depositor to face amount of check). 
14. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. As of June 1999, 49 states had 
adopted the 1990 revision to Article 4. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Ut-OIFORM 
CoMMERCIAL CoDE: SECURED TRANSACTIONS 23 (5th ed. 2000). 
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ensure that few disappointed consumers will sue their financial institu~ 
tions.16 Yet the possibility of tardy charge-back negatively impacts all con~ 
sumers who, over time, develop a false sense that their account balance is 
secure. Hardest hit are consumers who can least afford to maintain a pro~ 
tective balance as a buffer against the continuing threat of surprise charge~ 
back long after deposit. 
The inequity of tardy charge-back against consumers has been exacer~ 
bated by Regulation CC17 which, since 1988, has required banks to make 
deposited funds available within a specified period, now generally two to 
five business days following the banking day of deposit.1s Such access to a 
deposit may induce a consumer to believe that a deposited check is 
"good"-i.e., that she may spend the deposited funds without fear that her 
bank will later take the funds back.19 In a trap for the unwary consumer, 
however, Article 4 protects a bank's right to recapture withdrawn funds, 
even months after deposit, and long after the Regulation CC availability 
deadline has passed. 
Through this article, I hope to expose the inequity of tardy charge~ 
back on behalf of consumers who cannot afford to challenge it in the 
courts. I begin by briefly exploring the role of charge~back within the 
check collection system and then review the mechanics of charge~back, in~ 
cluding sanctions for bank failure to comply with charge-back directives. I 
then confront the general Article 4 rationale for negligence-blind charge-
back and question the social equity and economic efficiency of tardy 
charge-back. Finally, I propose a rule precluding charge~back against con~ 
sumer checks beyond six to ten banking days after deposit, a period drawn 
from Regulation CC's timetable for expeditious return of dishonored 
checks. Throughout this article, I interject Beutelisms20 in the hope that his 
16. In two rare cases of consumers suing their financial institutions over issues other 
than charge-back, the plaintiffs were both unhappy lawyers. Telephone Interview with Ed-
ward Rubin, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania (Oct. 1999). See Gray v. Am. 
Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 13 (D.e. Cir. 1984) (attorney-plaintiff challenged defendant's right 
to cancel credit card without notice and allegedly without cause); Drier v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 520, 520-21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983) (attorney-plaintiff challenged 
depository bank's failure to credit deposit of $201.50). 
17. Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2000), was promulgated in 
1988 pursuant to the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 
(1994). See generally BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, 
COLLECfIONS AND CREDIT CARDS <JI 7.01 (rev'd ed. 1995). 
18. 12 C.F.R. § 229.12. 
19. Many of my commercial transactions students hold a surprisingly tenacious, though 
erroneous, belief that a depositor's right to access funds has a finality that protects her from 
charge-back. Article 4, however, clearly provides that a depository bank may charge back 
despite withdrawal against a deposit. U.e.e. § 4-214(d) (1996) (stating that "right to charge 
back not affected by ... previous use of a credit"); see also John M. Norwood, Charge-Blick 
Rights of Collecting Banks, 113 BANKING L.J. 360, 373-74 (1996) (noting that in most cases 
collecting bank's rights are unaffected by withdrawal). 
20. The term "Beutelism" seems to have been coined by Grant Gilmore. Grunt 
Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Betttel, 61 YALE LJ. 364 
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irreverence will provoke skepticism, inspire indignation, or at least deter 
somnolence. 
II. 
THE CHARGE-BACK RIGHT: CONTEX.T. MECHANICS, 
AND SANcrIONS 
It is doubtful if the majority of the members [of the American Law 
Institute and the Commission on Uniform LawsJ lVOlild have ap-
proved [Article 4 J if they had known what they were doing . ... 21 
A. The Collection Context 
[Article 4J is a deliberate sell-ollt of the American Law Institllte 
and the Commission on Uniform Laws to the bank lobby . ... 22 
When a depository bank's collection effort fails and it receives the bad 
news that a check has bounced, the bank will protect itself by attempting to 
shift loss to its depositor. The bank's right to do so rests fundamentally on 
its status as an agent for collection. 
1. Depository Bank as Customer Agent 
When a consumer deposits a check in her account at a depository 
bank, she authorizes her bank to act as her agent to collect payment on the 
check.23 The depository bank begins this collection effort by fonvarding 
the check either to the payor bank directly or to an intermediary collecting 
bank24 such as a Federal Reserve Bank. The depository bank exercises 
ordinary care if it fonvards the check before its midnight deadline.2S Sec-
tion 4-104(10) defines a bank's "midnight deadline" as "midnight on its 
(1952). Professor Beutel was but one critic of the drafting of Article 4. a process Gilmore 
characterized as "the bloodiest battleground in the entire history of the Code." Donald J. 
Rapson, The Law of Modem Payment Systems and Notes by Fred H. Miller & AMn C. 
Harrell, 41 Bus. LAW. 675, 677 (1986) (book review). According to Gilmore. while some 
attacked Article 4 as pro-bank, "bank counsel (particularly the New York group) attacked it 
as a Communist plot designed to destroy the American banking system." 1cI. Ultimately. 
however, the banks won out, as a committee of bank counsel undertook the final draft, an 
outcome Gilmore described as "tantamount to appointing a committee of dogs to draw up a 
protective ordinance for cats." [d. 
21. Beutel, supra note 2, at 363. 
22. [d. at 362. 
23. This description of the check collection process is drawn largely from E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, JOHN O. HONNOLD, STEVEN L HARRIS & CURTIS R REITz. CASES, 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CoMMERCIAL LAW 125-34 (5th ed. 1993) [hereinafter 
FARNSWORTH]. For a more extensive discussion, see CLARK & CLARK, sllpra note 17. 
24. "Collecting bank" is defined as "a bank handling an item for collection except the 
payor bank." U.C.c. § 4-105(5) (1996). Under this definition, a collecting bank includes a 
depository bank unless the depository bank is also the payor bank. 
25. [d. § 4-202(b). 
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next banking day following the banking day on which it receives the rele-
vant item or notice or from which the time for taking action commences to 
run, whichever is later."26 In some cases, the bank may gain an extra day 
by setting a daily cutoff hour, which allows it to treat checks received after 
that hour as having been received the following day.27 
Once the check reaches the payor bank, it is usually charged to the 
drafter's account and later returned to the drafter with her monthly state-
ment.28 The payor bank does not ordinarily notify either the drafter or the 
depository bank that a check has been paid. If, however, the payor bank 
intends to dishonor the check, it must do so before its midnight deadline,29 
and it must provide the depository bank with "expeditious" notice of dis-
honor.30 In this system of "no news is good news,"31 the depository bank 
thus receives notice only when a check is not paid. 
At least in a well-ordered world, the payor bank's duty of expeditious 
return ensures that a depository bank will receive notice of dishonor before 
Regulation CC32 requires it to make a deposit available to its customer. If 
this is the case, and the customer has not drawn against the deposit, the 
depository bank has a simple recourse: notify the customer that she may 
not draw against the deposit, i.e., that provisional credit for the deposited 
check has been reversed. If the customer has already drawn against the 
deposit, before the depository bank receives notice of dishonor, the deposi-
tory bank's recourse is to charge back against other funds in the depositor's 
account or, if the depositor has a zero account balance, to seek a refund.:33 
After charge-back, the disappointed depositor ordinarily is left to her rights 
against the drafter34 or any indorser35 on the check, no matter how unpro-
ductive they may be. 
26. Id. § 4-104. A collecting bank thus takes timely action if it forwards a check re-
ceived on Monday by Thesday midnight. Section § 4-202(b) protects tardy banks by provid-
ing that "[tJaking proper action within a reasonably longer time may constitute the exercise 
of ordinary care, but the bank has the burden of establishing timeliness." For a discussion 
of this provision, see infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
27. U.e.e. § 4-108(a). Article 4 authorizes a bank to fix "an afternoon hour of two 
P.M. or later as a cutoff hour for the handling of money and items and the making of entries 
on its books," and provides that a check "received on any day after a cutoff hour so fixed ... 
may be treated as being received at the opening of the next banking day." See id. § 4-
108(a), (b). Thus, if a depository bank with a 2:00 P.M. cutoff hour receives a check on 
Monday at 3:00 P.M., the bank exercises ordinary care in fonvarding the check if it acts by 
Wednesday midnight. 
28. The 1990 revision to Article 4 removes impediments to check truncation. V.C.C. 
§ 4-110 (authorizing electronic presentment of checks); see also id. § 4-406(a) (authorizing 
bank to return paid check, make paid check available, or provide information in statement 
to allow customer to identify paid check). 
29. Id. § 4-301(a). 
30. 12 e.F.R. § 229.30(a) (2000). 
31. See FARNSWORTII, supra note 23, at 126. 
32. !d. 
33. For a more detailed discussion of the charge-back right, see infra Part II.B. 
34. See U.e.e. § 3-414(b) (1996) (dishonor triggers obligation of drafter on 
instrument). 
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A depository bank's right to shift loss to its depositor upon dishonor 
rests historically in the bank's status as an agent for collection,36 a status 
which Article 4 expressly recognizes.37 As an agent rather than a stake-
holder in the check, the depository bank normally does not guarantee pay-
ment, agreeing only to attempt to obtain payment on the deposited check. 
Just as the depository bank forwards payment to the depositor, it passes 
loss occasioned by nonpayment to the depositor through its powerful right 
of charge-back. 
One might expect that as Article 4 guards the bank's ability as agent to 
shift loss to a customer, it will also police the bank's agency functions to 
afford some protection to customers. Such policing seems especially im-
portant in the case of consumer customers. Unfortunately, Article 4 is 
likely to disappoint those expecting significant consumer protection. 
2. Depository Bank Duties of Good Faith and Ordinary Care 
The U.C.C. requires a depository bank to act with good faith and ordi-
nary care in performing its collection tasks. The meaning of these duties, 
however, may be less than clear and may depend at least partly on stan-
dards established by banks themselves.38 
The depository bank's duty of good faith reflects the general principle 
of Article 1 requiring good faith in the performance or enforcement of 
every contract or duty.39 Under the pre-1990 version of Article 3, a bank's 
good faith is tested under the Article 1 definition of "honesty in fact,"40 a 
subjective test that disregards the reasonableness of one's position.41 The 
1990 revision to Article 3 adds an objective component to this test, defining 
good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
35. See id. § 3-415 (dishonor triggers liability of indorser on instrument). 
36. Depository banks have long guarded their status as nonstakeholders. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bankers added clauses to deposit slips specif)ing 
their agency role. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 186 (commenting that while 
such language exists on deposit slips, it is absent from the U.C.C.). They also included a 
provision in the Bank Collection Code e"llressly recognizing their status as agents rather 
than owners of checks. Norwood, supra note 19, at 361. 
37. Section 4-201(a) provides in part 
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and before the time that a settlement 
given by a collecting bank for an item is or becomes final, the bank. with respect to 
the item, is an agent or sub-agent of the owner of the item and any settlement 
given for the item is provisional. 
u.c.c. § 4-201(a). 
38. Parties may opt out of these u.c.c. definitions so long as their standards of good 
faith and ordinary care are not "manifestly unreasonable." [d. § 4-103(a). 
39. Section 1-203 provides, "[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith in its performance or enforcement." [d. § 1-203. 
40. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1988). This Article 1 definition of good faith was not revised in 
1990. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (1996). 
41. lAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-6 
(4th ed. 1995). This subjective standard is often termed the "pure heart and empty head" 
standard. See, e.g., Maine Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 727 A.2d 
335, 340 (Me. 1999). 
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standards of fair dealing."42 One court recently interpreted this new lan-
guage as asking, "first, whether the conduct of the holder comported with 
industry or 'commercial' standards applicable to the transaction and, sec-
ond, whether those standards were reasonable standards intended to result 
in fair dealing."43 The same court, however, observed that this new test is 
"not a model of drafting clarity."44 
In addition to its duty of good faith, a collecting bank must exercise 
"ordinary care" in the performance of basic collection tasks.45 Like good 
faith, ordinary care is a chameleon; its meaning is relational, taken from 
surrounding circumstances and reflecting the limited duty to act in ways 
others think is reasonable. Ordinary care, explains section 3-103, is the 
"observance of reasonable commercial standards prevailing in the area in 
which the person is located . . . . "46 
While the objective test of good faith and ordinary care establishes a 
more rigorous standard than a subjective test of actual honesty, the objec-
tive standard offers limited protection to consumers since it allows banks at 
least partly to define, through their own practices, the standard of good 
faith and care to which they are held. It is true that nothing in the V.C.C. 
"prevent[ s] a customer from proving that the procedures followed by a 
bank are unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair,"47 and, indeed, the objective 
test of good faith has been interpreted to invite such a challenge.48 For the 
consumer, however, this opportunity to establish unfairness in generally 
followed procedures may be an expensive proposition and therefore one 
that is more significant in theory than in practice. 
Furthermore, special rules protect banks against potential charges of 
untimely action. Here, Article 4 partially abandons the relational test of 
ordinary care, opting for a bright-line rule that creates a safe harbor for 
banks falling within its boundaries. Section 4-202 thus provides that "[al 
collecting bank exercises ordinary care ... by taking proper action before 
42. V.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1996). This Article 3 definition applies to all negotiable in-
struments, including checks. Gail Hillebrand suggests that this new definition of good faith 
may be the most significant benefit to consumers offered by revised Articles 3 and 4. See 
Hillebrand, supra note 10, at 694. 
43. Maine Family Fed. Credit Union, 727 A.2d at 343. Applying this test, the court 
found a rational basis for a jury finding that a credit union did not act in good faith when it 
allowed customers to draw against a large insurance check on the day of deposit, a conclu-
sion that has been questioned by commentators. See, e.g., ROBERT L. JORDAN, WILLIAM D. 
WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 49 
(5th ed. 2000) (opining that court's conclusion is "a stretch"). 
44. Maine Family Fed. Credit Union, 727 A.2d at 341. 
45. Section 4-202 expressly directs collecting banks to act with ordinary care in per-
forming four tasks: (1) presentment (the transfer of an item to the payor bank), (2) sending 
notice of dishonor or nonpayment, (3) settling for an item upon receiving final payment, 
and (4) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit. V.C.C. § 4-202(a). 
46. [d. § 3-103(a)(7). Section 4-104(c) provides that this Article 3 definition of ordi-
nary care is applicable to Article 4. [d. § 4-104(c). 
47. [d. § 3-103 cmt. 5. 
48. Maine Family Fed. Credit Union, 727 A.2d at 343. 
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its midnight deadline following receipt of an item, notice or settlement. "49 
Under this provision, a bank receiving a check on Monday, for example, 
can establish its ordinary care simply by shO\ving it forwarded the check 
before Tuesday midnight.50 
As Article 4 offers a safe harbor for a bank acting within its midnight 
deadline, one might expect it to create serious risks for a bank overshoot-
ing that harbor. Not so. To protect tardy banks, an Article 4 official com-
ment explains that the subsection provides "flexibility from the standard 
norm" so that taking "action ,vithin a reasonably longer time may be timely 
but the bank has the burden of proof."sl The message under this bright-
line, midnight deadline rule is thus: timeliness is care; tardiness is care if 
other banks say so. 
Conspicuously absent from this timeliness rule is any safe harbor for a 
depositor, who even in extreme cases cannot establish an absence of ordi-
nary care simply by counting days. As Professor Beutel might say, this rule 
is curiously "one-sided."52 Much more troublesome are the Code's exag-
geratedly one-sided charge-back rules. 
B. Charge-Back Mechanics 
[Banks] have succeeded, with the aid of their lawyers, in shifting 
many of the risks of the banking business to their cllstomers, where 
fairness in bank collections would require that the bank be the in-
surer of the paper which it is to collect. 53 
1. A Self-Help Remedy54 
Upon notice of nonpayment, Article 4 broadly authorizes the deposi-
tory bank to proceed against its depositor in three ways: (1) where credit 
has been extended but has not been drawn upon, the depository bank may 
simply revoke this credit; (2) where a depositor has drawn against the de-
posit, but there is a remaining account balance, the bank may charge back 
49. u.c.e § 4-202(b). For definition of "collecting bank," see supra notes 24-25 and 
accompanying text. 
50. Article 4 allows a bank to fix "an afternoon hour of two P.M. or later as a cutoff 
hour for the handling of money and items and the making of entries on its books." U.C.C. 
§ 4-108(a). For a brief discussion of this section, see supra note 27 and accompan}ing text. 
51. See id. § 4-202 cmt. 3. The official comment also notes that the standard time frame 
may be varied in cases of excused delay. [d.; see also § 4-109 (excusing delay "caused by 
interruption of communication or computer facilities, suspension of payments by another 
bank, war, emergency conditions, failure of equipment, or other circumstances beyond the 
control of the bank" where "the bank exercises such diligence as the circumstances 
require."). 
52. Beutel, supra note 2, at 362. 
53. [d. at 361. 
54. Self-help has been defined as "one party's ability to take control of an item or sum 
of money in dispute without judicial intervention." Rubin, supra note 11, at 36. 
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the account against this balance; and (3) where a depositor has a zero ac-
count balance, the bank may obtain a refund from the depositor.55 In the 
first two of these cases, the depository bank may shift loss to a depositor 
through a simple "bookkeeping maneuver,"S6 a self-help remedy that is vir-
tually cost-free for the bank. 
After offering a depository bank this powerful right of charge-back, 
the Code makes clear that a bank is not obliged to use it.57 A depository 
bank may thus waive charge-back and seek recovery against the drafter of 
the check,58 against an indorser (including the depositor),59 or against a 
third party.60 
The right of charge-back "terminates if and when a settlement for the 
item received by the bank is or becomes final."61 When the depository 
bank thus receives payment on the check, its collection task is complete, its 
agency status ceases, and it has no need or basis for charge-back.62 In prac-
tice, this termination principle serves less to limit the right of charge-back 
than to extend it to cases in which a check is paid but for some reason 
(likely involving a breakdown in the collection chain) the depository bank 
does not receive final settlement.63 In such cases, the depository bank's 
charge-back right continues despite the payor bank's payment. 
55. In the second and third of these scenarios, the Regulation CC funds-availability 
schedule may have required the depository bank to make the deposited check available for 
withdrawal. 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 (2000). 
56. 5 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SE. 
RIES § 4-212:1 (1994) [hereinafter HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE] ("[C]harging back an item 
against the customer's account is simply a bookkeeping maneuver removing a provisional 
credit from the customer's account."). 
57. U.e.e. § 4-214(e) (1996) ("[F]ailure to charge back ... does not affect other rights 
of the bank against the customer or any other party."). 
58. Dishonor of the check triggers the drafter's obligation to pay the instrument. Ill. 
§ 3-414(b). This obligation is owed "to a person entitled to enforce the draft or to an in-
dorser who paid the draft .... " Id. 
59. Dishonor of the check triggers the indorser's obligation to pay the instrument. Ill. 
§ 3-415(a). This obligation is owed "to a person entitled to enforce the instrument or to a 
subsequent indorser who paid the instrument under this section." Id. 
60. See, e.g., Girard Trust Com Exch. Bank v. Brinks, Inc., 220 A.2d 827, 829 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1966) (holding that upon dishonor of check, bank could pursue negligent courier 
rather than its customer). 
61. U.e.e. § 4-214(a). 
62. HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 56, at § 4-212:5. A few depository banks 
have run afoul of this termination provision, however, by charging back after the payor 
bank had made final payment. See, e.g., Sun Bank v. Merrill Lynch, 637 So. 2d 279,282-83 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (charge-back upon allegation of forged indorsement improper 
more than one year after final settlement); Boggs v. Citizens Bank & Thust Co. of Md., 363 
A.2d 247, 250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (charge-back improper seven months after final 
settlement). In such cases of forgery, the depository bank may recover upstream on a 
breach of warranty theory. See U.e.e. § 4-207(1)(a) (transferor of iIlstrument warrants that 
it is person entitled to enforce instrument). 
63. As an Article 4 official comment explains, charge-back is available "in those cases 
in which the item being collected is not finally paid or if for various reasons the bank mak-
ing the provisional settlement does not itself receive final payment .... " U.C.e. § 4-214 
cmt. 1. 
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2. A Hidden-Clock Timeliness Directive 
Article 4 directs a depository bank to act promptly in exercising its 
charge-back right.64 The Code's definition of timeliness. however, subverts 
the potential of this directive to offer meaningful consumer protection. 
Section 4-214(a) directs a depository bank to return the dishonored 
check or notify its customer of the dishonor by the bank's "midnight dead-
line or within a longer reasonable time after it learns the facts . ... "65 Be-
cause the facts that trigger this charge-back clock are the facts that establish 
nonpayment, the charge-back clock begins to tick only when the depository 
bank receives notice of dishonor. Under this test of timeliness. a deposi-
tory bank receiving notice of dishonor on Tuesday morning, for example. 
should charge back before midnight on Wednesday.66 In an alternative 
measure that compromises the certainty of this midnight deadline. Article 4 
assures the depository bank that if Wednesday seems too soon. it may take 
a "longer reasonable time.,,67 
This charge-back timeliness directive is fundamentally troublesome 
because it marks time by reference to a clock the consumer cannot see. 
The date the depository bank receives notice of nonpayment will usually be 
unknown to the consumer prior to charge-back. Meanwhile. the consumer 
has been counting the days since deposit in an effort to gauge the integrity 
of her account balance. To the surprise of the unwary consumer. Article 4 
makes charge-back timely many months after deposit. so long as it occurs 
promptly after the depository bank receives notice of dishonor.68 Too bad 
64. This promptness directive is consistent with the general Article 4 scheme of encour-
aging efficient handling of checks. For a sampling of other rules designed to encourage 
efficiency, see U.C.C. § 4-202(b) (collecting bank exercises ordinary care in handling check 
"by taking proper action before its midnight deadline following receipt of an item. notice or 
settlement"). See also U.C.C. § 4-302(a)(1) (payor bank becomes accountable for amount 
of check it fails to dishonor by midnight deadline). 
65. [d. § 4-214(a) (emphasis added). For a definition of the midnight deadline, see 
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. Oral notice has been held sufficient to satisfy the 
notice directive. See, e.g., Yoder v. Cromwell State Bank, 478 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. App. 1985). 
See generally Norwood, supra note 19, at 371-72. 
66. A bank may be able to extend this time frame by designating a cutoff hour of 2:00 
P.M. or later. See U.C.C. § 4-108(a); supra note 27. Such a cutoff hour would allow a bank 
to treat notice received on Monday after 2:00 P.M. as having been received on Tuesday. See 
U.C.c. § 4-108(b). At least one court, however, has held a bank's cutoff hour inapplicable 
to questions regarding receipt of notice of dishonor. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
v. Devon Bank, 702 F. Supp. 652, 662-63 (N.D. D1. 1988) (reasoning that cutoff right applies 
only to items and deposits of money, not to notice of dishonor); see also Norwood. supra 
note 19, at 371. 
67. See U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (1996). For an application of this alternative time frame, see 
Pandol Bros. Inc. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., 450 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(reversing summary judgment for bank that failed to meet its midnight deadline and re-
manding for determination of whether notice was given within "a longer reasonable time"'). 
68. See, e.g., Symonds v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n .• 275 Cal. Rptr. 871. 876-n (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990) (check deposited on 11/28/88, depository bank received notice of nonpay-
ment on 7124/89, and depository bank charged back on 7125189; "while Mercury may be 
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for the consumer who has been lulled into a false reliance on her account 
balance by a time-lag between deposit and charge-back. 
The Code's rejection of the date of deposit as a benchmark for timeli-
ness is not only consumer-hostile, but curiously inconsistent with the 
Code's no-news-is-good-news collection scheme. Under this scheme, a de-
pository bank, like a consumer, assumes that the passage of time since de-
posit without news of nonpayment means that a check has been paid.69 
Consumer reliance on the deposit date therefore can hardly be said to be 
unreasonable, for banks themselves engage in similar reliance. 
Central to the Code's no-news-is-good-news scheme is the duty of all 
banks in the collection chain to handle a check in a timely manner. Over-
laying the Article 4 rules encouraging efficient handling of checks by col-
lecting banks70 and payor banks71 is the federal Regulation CC 
requirement that paying and returning banks send expeditious notice of 
any dishonor.72 Because all banks involved in collection are required to act 
promptly, in a well-ordered world the depository bank will receive any no-
tice of dishonor within a short time after deposit. Thus it is reasonable to 
presume that any extended delay between the date of deposit and the date 
of charge-back involves tardiness by one or more banks in the collection 
chain.73 The Code's use of the date of notice of dishonor rather than the 
date of deposit may serve primarily to make charge-back timely in cases of 
apparent bank mishandling. 
Rejection of the date of deposit as a benchmark for timely charge-
back thus reflects a departure from banking practice that offers extraordi-
nary protection to misbehaving banks at the expense of surprised consum-
ers. To make matters worse for the consumer, the Code delivers a mere 
slap on the wrist to a bank that fails to meet even this generous timeliness 
directive. 
entitled to charge back appellant's account ... appellant has alleged sufficient facts to state 
a negligence cause of action"). 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32. 
70. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
72. 12 e.F.R. § 229.30(a), (f) (2000) (paying bank); id. § 229.31(a), (f) (returning bank). 
73. In unusual cases, bank tardiness may be excused by such factors as computer fail-
ure, bank failure, and war. U.e.e. § 4-109 (1996). Belated notice of a forged indorsement 
long after deposit and after payment of the check does not raise an issue of timely charge-
back since the depository bank lost its charge-back right earlier when it received payment 
for the check. See Sun Bank, N.A. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 637 So. 2d 
279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1994) (interpreting FLA. STAT. chs. 671.212-213 (1991) [correspond-
ing to U.C.e. §§ 4-214,4-215 (1996)] to disallow charge-back where final payment was made 
prior to discovery of forgery); see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 2 UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 20-6 (Practitioner's ed., 1997 pocket part). For a discussion of termi-
nation of the right of charge-back due to payment, see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying 
text. 
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C. Consequences of Bank Misbehavior 
By a trick provision of section 4-103 and sub-section 4, the bank is 
not bound to follow any of the collection procedures set out in the 
act74 
551 
Banks have many opportunities to behave badly. Among other things. 
a depository bank may mislay the deposited check, delay in forwarding it. 
or fail to charge back in a timely manner.75 In any case of depository bank 
misbehavior, two questions arise. The first issue is one of ultimate liability: 
Would the misbehaving bank be liable to a depositor who initiates litiga-
tion against it? The second question is one of temporary loss: May a mis-
behaving bank shift loss to its depositor through charge-back? While these 
questions are distinct, they are also necessarily related. for even though a 
naughty bank may in theory be liable ultimately to its customer. if the cus-
tomer cannot bear the costs of initiating litigation to establish this liability. 
loss will remain where charge-back places it-with the customer. 
1. Ultimate Liability: The "Penalty" 
If a depository bank negligently handles a check, section 4-103 makes 
the bank liable for "the amount of the item reduced by an amount that 
could not have been realized by the exercise of ordinary care."76 Under 
this basic rule, a depository bank is liable to its depositor if the check would 
have been paid had the bank properly handled it.77 Conversely, if the 
check would not have been paid even if properly handled. the bank's negli-
gence has caused no actual loss and thus triggers no ultimate bank liability. 
Under this rule, the babysitter whose account was charged back months 
after deposit could shift ultimate loss to her bank upon proof that her 
paycheck would have been paid if properly handled. 
74. Beutel, supra note 2, at 360. At the time Professor Beutel wrote, section 4-103(4) 
provided, "[t]he specification or approval of certain procedures by this Article does not 
preclude an agreement authorized by sub-section (1), nor constitute disapproval of other 
procedures which may be reasonable under the circumstances." U.C.C. § 4-103(4) (1951). 
A similar provision now appears in section 4-103(d) which provides, "[t]he specification or 
approval of certain procedures by this article is not disapproval of other procedures that 
may be reasonable under the circumstances." U.e.C. § 4-103(d) (1996). 
75. Additional opportunities for negligence include the careless choosing of intermedi-
ary banks, forwarding items to banks known to be insolvent, or misrouting an item. though 
liability attaches should the bank's activities breach its "duty of ordinary care:' See HAWK. 
LAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 56, at § 4-202:2. 
76. As the official comment to this section eXl'lains, "[w]hen it is established that some 
part or all of the item could not have been collected even by the use of ordinary care the 
recovery is reduced by the amount that would have been in any event uncollectible." 
u.e.e. § 4-103 cmt. 6 (1996). 
77. A depository bank acting in bad faith is liable additionally for "any other damages 
the party suffered as a proximate consequence." Id. § 4-103(e). The official comment to 
this section explains that "if bad faith is established the rule opens to allow the recovery of 
other damages, whose proximateness is to be tested by the ordinary rules applied in compa-
rable cases." Id. § 4-103 cmt. 6. 
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When a depository bank's negligence is its tardy exercise of the 
charge-back right, this loss rule makes the bank liable ultimately only to 
the depositor who suffers actual loss because of the bank's tardiness.7s 
Thus, a depositor might prevail against her tardy bank by proving that if 
the bank had timely notified her that the check had bounced, she would 
not have released funds to the drafter.'9 
The Code's preference for this common law loss rule over a rule of 
strict liability for negligence seems grounded in a determination that a de-
positor should not unfairly profit from bank negligence. Indeed, under a 
rule of strict liability, a depositor might recover against a negligent bank 
even though the deposited check would not have been paid even if prop-
erly handled, thus affording the depositor a windfall. As persuasive as it 
may initially appear, this windfall rationale is troublesome in its willingness 
to leave loss with a consumer depositor who may be unable to initiate liti-
gation to establish that bank misbehavior caused her an actual loss, even 
where this is SO.80 Because consumers typically lack the resources neces-
sary to sue their banks,81 the Code in practice places ultimate loss on con-
sumers without regard to whether bank misbehavior caused an actual loss. 
Such a rule creates little incentive for banks to exercise care in handling 
consumer checks since there is little danger that a consumer will call a bank 
to task for its misbehavior. Given the financial inability of most consumers 
to shift ultimate loss to a bank, the critical issue for a consumer is whether a 
naughty bank can shift "temporary" loss to her through charge-back. 
2. "Temporary" Loss-Shifting: The Right 
Suppose a depository bank negligently handles a deposited check that 
is subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. Suppose further that de-
pository or other bank negligence seems very likely because of a time lag 
between the dates of deposit and charge-back.82 May the depository bank 
nonetheless charge back its depositor's account, thereby shifting to the de-
positor the burden of initiating litigation to prove bank negligence and re-
sulting loss? Stated differently, is there any charge-back sanction for bank 
misbehavior? Article 4 offers a surprising answer to these questions. 
Section 4-214(d) provides that the "right to charge back is not affected 
by ... failure by any bank to exercise ordinary care with respect to the 
item, but a bank so failing remains liable."83 Preempting any consumer-
78. Section 4-214(a) provides in pertinent part: "If return or notice [of dishonor] is 
delayed ... the bank is liable for any loss resulting from the delay." Id. § 4-214(a). 
79. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Akpan, 398 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1977) (collecting bank estopped from charging back due to tardy notification that cashed 
check was drawn on insufficient funds). 
80. See infra Part II.B. 
81. See infra text accompanying notes 112-15. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73. 
83. V.C.C. § 4-214(d). 
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friendly interpretation of this language, however tenuous, the official com-
ment to this section candidly observes that "charge-back is permitted even 
if nonpayment results from the depository bank's own negligence."84 The 
rule authorizing charge-back, explains the comment, "applies irrespective 
of the cause of the nonpayment, and of the person ultimately liable for 
nonpayment."85 Thus, while a depository bank may be ultimately liable to 
a consumer who proves bank negligence and resulting loss, the bank's right 
to charge back is not compromised by its negligence. Although it would be 
possible to preclude charge-back while leaving open the possibility of ulti-
mate loss-shifting,86 the Code protects the negligent bank's right to engage 
in self-help against a consumer. 
Similarly, Article 4 expressly provides that a bank whose misbehavior 
is tardiness retains its right to charge back its customer's account.87 The 
consumer's recourse in cases of tardiness, as in cases of other bank negli-
gence, lies in her theoretical ability to initiate litigation against her bank to 
fix ultimate liability.88 
Article 4 did not always so clearly protect a tardy bank's right of 
charge-back. The pre-1990 language of Article 4 contained a timely notice 
requirement, but did not specify the consequence of tardiness.89 This gap 
inspired some courts to interpret this language as creating a condition pre-
cedent to the right of charge-back. A Tennessee court, for example, held 
charge-back improper five months after deposit and five weeks after the 
depository bank received notice of nonpayment.90 A New York court simi-
larly found charge-back improper six months after deposit,91 and a Utah 
court found it improper two months after deposit.92 
Such holdings conditioning the right of charge-back on timely notice 
were expressly rejected in the 1990 revision to Article 4. In addition to 
inserting new language that protects the right of charge-back in cases of 
tardiness,93 the official comment to section 4-214 rejects the view that 
84. Id. § 4-214 cmt. 5. 
85. Id. 
86. For such a proposal, see infra Parts III-IV. 
87. Section 4-214(a) provides in pertinent part: "If the rcturn or notice is delayed be-
yond the bank's midnight deadline or a longer reasonable time after it learns the facts, the 
bank may revoke the settlement, charge back the credit, or obtain a refund from its cus-
tomer, but is liable for any loss resulting from the delay." U.C.C. § 4-214(a). 
88. See id. 
89. Prior to 1990, section 4-212(1) authorized a depository bank to charge back "if by 
its midnight deadline or ,vithin a longer reasonable time after it learns the facts it returns 
the item or sends notification of the facts." U.C.C. § 4-212 (1988) (renumbered in 1990 as 4-
214(a)). 
90. Smallman v. Home Fed. Say. Bank of Tenn., 786 S.W.2d 954, 955-56 (Tenn. App. 
1989). 
91. Zimmer v. Independence Say. Bank, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 2d 891, 893 (N.Y. Civ. 
Ct. 1996) (applying pre-1990 Article 4). 
92. FIrst Sec. Bank of Utah V. Lundahl Nat'l Ass'n, 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969). 
93. In 1990, the following sentence was added to the charge-back section: "If the rc-
turn or notice is delayed beyond the bank's midnight deadline or a longer reasonable time 
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charge-back is conditioned on timeliness, specifying that "a [tardy] collect-
ing bank loses its rights only to the extent of damages for any loss resulting 
from the delay."94 A tardy bank, like a negligent bank, is therefore entitled 
to shift loss to its depositor through charge-back notwithstanding the 
bank's misbehavior. 
The injured customer's recourse after charge-back lies in her theoreti-
cal opportunity to shift loss back to her bank through litigation establishing 
that bank negligence or tardiness caused her an actual loss. The class of 
depositors actually protected by this litigation-recourse rule consists only of 
depositors who are empowered to initiate litigation against banks, a class 
likely to include a disparately small number of consumers.95 As a practical 
matter, therefore, the bank's charge-back right will very likely fix ultimate 
liability on the consumer who is financially unable to shift loss to her bank 
even where banking misconduct caused actual loss. The charge-back rule 
that facilitates this inequity must be justified, or it must be changed. 
III. 
JUSTIFYING TARDY CHARGE-BACK 
Article [4] is so one-sidedly drawn in favor of the banking interests 
that any banker who insisted on exercising the rights given him by 
this "Code" would probably be under suspicion by the better busi-
ness bureau. 96 
The simplest explanation for Article 4's tolerance of tardy charge-back 
may lie in the nightmare of a depositor who receives a windfall because of 
bank delay.97 In this dreadful vision, the deposited check was never prop-
erly payable. The depositor ordinarily therefore would not receive pay-
ment, yet the happenstance of bank tardiness allows her to recover against 
her bank. Like nightmares generally, this one exaggerates the stakes. 
Charge-back does not fix ultimate liability, but rather enables a bank to 
shift to its customer temporary loss and thus the burden of initiating litiga-
tion to establish ultimate loss.98 If a tardy bank were precluded from 
charging back a consumer, the bank would nonetheless retain the right to 
shift ultimate loss to the consumer upon proof that tardiness caused no 
harm. Because charge-back does not necessarily fix ultimate loss, the 
windfall nightmare offers an unconvincing rationale for tardy charge-back. 
after it learns the facts, the bank may revoke the settlement, charge back the credit, or 
obtain refund from its customer, but is liable for any loss resulting from the delay." V.e.e. 
§ 4-214(a) (1996). 
94. Id. § 4-214 cmt. 3. 
95. See infra text accompanying notes 112-15. 
96. Beutel, supra note 2, at 362. 
97. For a critique of the windfall possibility as a justification for the Code's ultimate 
loss rule, see supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
98. For a discussion of the distinction between temporary loss-shifting through charge-
back and ultimate liability, see supra text accompanying notes 75-95. 
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A. A Dubious Code Rationale 
Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections is an unfair piece of 
class legislation. 99 
555 
Article 4 does not attempt to provide a specific justification for its rule 
permitting charge-back by a tardy bank. An official comment, hO\vever, 
does attempt to justify the general rule permitting charge-back by a negli-
gent bank. Since tardiness may constitute negligence, this comment might 
also offer a justification for tardy charge-back. 
Permitting a negligent bank to charge back, explains the comment to 
section 4-214, is necessary to protect banks because "[a]ny other rule would 
result in litigation based upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other 
checks of the customer, ,vith potential damages far in excess of the amount 
of the item."lOO Any other rule, continues the comment, "would require a 
bank to determine difficult questions of fact."IOI Apparently. these "diffi-
cult questions," which if wrongly answered would subject the bank to ex-
cessive liability, involve determinations of bank negligence and resulting 
depositor loss, facts which would make a depository bank ultimately liable 
to its depositor.102 One can indeed imagine the unfairness of requiring a 
depository bank to resolve such issues in the fleeting moments during 
which charge-back is authorized. 
The problem with this reasoning is that these "difficult questions" 
need not be answered prior to charge-back. Because charge-back does not 
fix ultimate liability/o3 a depository bank could forego charge-back while 
retaining the right to shift ultimate loss to its customer if it later concludes 
this is appropriate. The comment, however, altogether fails to distinguish 
between temporary and ultimate liability, apparently assuming that issues 
determining ultimate loss must be resolved prior to shifting temporary loss. 
Moreover, the comment's "difficult questions" rationale erroneously 
assumes the existence of difficult questions. In some cases, such as those 
involving bank tardiness in handling a check, negligence can be identified 
presumptively by comparing the date of deposit with the date of intended 
charge-back.104 In the babysitter's case, the depository bank could hardly 
99. Beutel, supra note 2, at 335. 
100. U.C.C. § 4-214 cmt. 5 (1996). 
101. Id (emphasis added). 
102. The comment thus suggests that if the depository bank erroneously answered 
these questions, incorrectly concluding that it could properly charge back. it would be liable 
to a depositor whose subsequent checks were dishonored because her account balance had 
been reduced by an improper charge-back. See id. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81. 
104. Since all banks are required to handle a check properly. a time-lag between de-
posit and charge-back strongly indicates misbehavior by one or more banks. Sec supra text 
accompanying notes 68-73. 
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claim difficulty in identifying probable bank negligence since checks nor-
mally do not require several months for collection. While issues of deposi-
tor injury in such cases may be more difficult to resolve swiftly, these issues 
need not be resolved prior to charge-back, but rather in the more delibera-
tive setting necessary to fix ultimate liability. Should a bank claim an ex-
cuse for the delayed handling, this issue also could be resolved as part of 
the ultimate liability determination. It would thus be possible to preclude 
charge-back in cases of bank tardiness without requiring a bank to answer 
any difficult questions. 105 
Certainly not all negligence can be identified as easily as bank tardi-
ness. The official comment to section 4-214, however, offers only a global 
justification for negligence-blind charge-back that fails to distinguish be-
tween ultimate and temporary liability, and between tardiness and other 
negligence. That the rule permitting tardy charge-back is not necessary to 
protect banks compounds its injustice. 
B. Social Equity 
Uniform Commercial Code is a misnomer; it should be called the 
Lawyers and Bankers Relief Act. 106 
Professor Beutel's indignation over Article 4 rests on the critical as-
sumption that its rules should be fair. Indeed, there is no reason why the 
rules applicable to banks should be exempt from the general principles of 
equity and fair play that underscore less arcane bodies of law. 
Professor Rubin suggests two impressionistic exercises to identify rules 
that violate norms of social equity.l07 The first exercise, based on empathy, 
is "to place oneself in the position of a particular person, and ask whether 
one would reasonably experience a sense of unfairness or resentment."lOB 
A second exercise, based on rationality, "is to imagine addressing a person 
who felt disadvantaged, and see if one can formulate a satisfactory way of 
explaining to the person why the situation must continue.,,109 
Placing oneself in the shoes of the babysitterllo is likely to provoke a 
sense of unfairness and resentment because of the rude surprise she has 
suffered. Long after the babysitter reasonably assumed her account bal-
ance was secure, her bank exercised its statutory right of self-help against 
her, reducing her account balance by the amount of her bounced paycheck, 
and thus depriving her of funds needed to cover outstanding checks drawn 
in reliance on her balance. Her bank's entitlement to help itself to her 
105. For such a proposal, see infra Parts III-IV. 
106. Beutel, supra note 2, at 363. 
107. Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 
42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 570 (1991). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See supra Part I. 
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account balance is unaffected by the appearance of bank misbehavior in-
herent in the long delay between deposit and charge-back. 
The general Article 4 answer to the babysitter is that she can initiate 
litigation to recapture her account balance in an appropriate case. This 
litigation recourse rationale is hardly a satisfactory answer for the babysit-
ter. As a threshold matter, the babysitter is probably unaware that she can 
shift loss to her bank by proving that bank tardiness caused her a 10SS.111 
Even if she is aware of her rights against her bank, she may be intimidated 
by the prospect of combat with a bank in a legal system that seems "arcane, 
complex and dangerous."112 Should she decide to undertake such combat, 
the babysitter will surely require the aid of a commercial lawyer. with 
whom she is unlikely to have an existing relationship. and whom she may 
have difficulty locating.113 
Even if she can overcome these initial hurdles. she may conclude that 
litigation is too expensive, either because she lacks necessary funds or be-
cause litigation costs would exceed the benefits sought. i.e.. the face 
amount of her paycheck.1l4 Indeed, the bank may be able to ensure this 
unfavorable cost-benefit ratio by driving up the babysitter's litigation costs. 
Babysitters and banks do not come to court as equals. 1 IS As a repeat 
player in litigation, a bank's litigation costs are almost certain to be less 
than those of a consumer. The bank can more easily acquire the services of 
an attorney, through its own legal department, or through its ongoing rela-
tionship with outside counsel; it may deduct attorney fees from its taxes.116 
and it has the resources to acquire information about the failed collection 
attempt. Moreover, as repeat players, banks are \villing to spend more on 
litigation than consumers who, as one-time players, are concerned only 
with the immediate outcome. In a worst case scenario. a bank will initiate a 
game of financial "chicken" against a consumer plaintiff who sooner or 
later must yield to the bank's superior resources.117 
For all these reasons, litigation against a tardy bank to shift loss im-
posed by charge-back may be an unreasonable alternative for a babysitter. 
Consequently, loss will very probably remain with the babysitter even 
111. Most consumers are unlikely to be aware of the U.C.C. loss allocation rules. See. 
e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocalion for Consumer 
Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 68 n.32 (1987). Indeed, some of my commercial transactions 
students would argue this ignorance is rational since the cost of obtaining such information 
exceeds its expected value. 
112. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 23. 
113. fd. at 21. 
114. Professor Rubin suggests that $2500 is the minimum amount in controversy for 
which it is rational for a consumer to hire a lawyer. See id. at 21-22. 
115. As Professor Rubin observes, "[I]t is an essential element of our socially devel-
oped sense of fairness that litigants should come to court as equals. Their chances of pre-
vailing should depend upon the strength of their legal positions. and not upon attributes 
external to the case such as their appearance, religion, or personal wealth... [d. at 43. 
116. fd. at 27. 
117. fd. at 29. 
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though she has been wronged. In Professor Rubin's words, "[t]his is the 
paradigmatic case of unfairness: to feel that one is right but know that one 
has no redress.,,118 
C. Economic Efficiency 
[The U. C. C.] has been hurriedly drafted and relentlessly pushed 
through . .. [with] little or no impartial research into the economic 
needs of the business community which the Code attempts to regu-
late in detail. 119 
The principal objection to tardy charge-back is that it unfairly allocates 
to consumers costs they cannot bear, frustrating their efforts to assert legiti-
mate rights. An important follow-up question is whether principles of eco-
nomic efficiency support, conflict with, or are neutral toward the Article 4 
rule allowing belated charge-back against consumers. If efficiency princi-
ples support such a rule, then consumers collectively may be better off with 
it although some individuals may be hard-hit. 
Generally, an economically efficient payment system will keep costs to 
a minimum, benefiting both banks (which can provide services at lower 
cost) and consumers (who will pay less for banking services). In a well-
ordered market, parties seek to negotiate agreements that are cost-reduc-
ing.120 In a market that is not well-ordered, possibly because of informa-
tion asymmetry between the parties,121 market failure may produce 
inefficiency-namely, agreements that do not reduce the parties' costs. In 
the case of consumers and their banks, where actual negotiation is rare, the 
efficiency question is whether an asymmetry between financial institutions 
and consumers in the drafting of Article 4 produced a tardy charge-back 
rule that inefficiently allocates IOSS.122 
118. Rubin, supra note 107, at 577. 
119. Beutel, supra note 2, at 334. 
120. Rubin, supra note 107, at 561. 
121. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 111, at 68-69. Other sources of market failure in-
clude monopoly and externalities (costs imposed on third parties). Rubin, supra note 107, 
at 561-64. 
122. For a history of the drafting process and an observation that consumers were seri-
ously underrepresented, see Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lob-
byist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising vee Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 
743 (1993). According to Professor Rubin, "in the ABA Committee and, as far as I could 
tell, in the ALI-NCCUSL [American Law Institute-National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws] Drafting Committee, only two of the three principal interests-
financial institutions, corporate users and consumers-were represented." Id. at 759-60. 
Professor Rubin reports that prior to initiation of the drafting process, NCCUSL agreed 
with the banking industry that the revision "would not alter the balance between banks and 
consumers that existed in the original Articles 3 and 4, nor would it add any new provisions 
dealing with consumer protection." Id. at 746. 
Donald Rapson, a member of the Article 3 and 4 drafting committee has a different 
view. "Contrary to the comments of Professors Rubin and Patchel-who did not attend the 
Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Review of Law and Social Change 
HeinOnline -- 25 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 559 1999
1999] HOT CHECKS, TARDY BANKS, AND THE ac.e. 559 
Professors Rubin and Cooter suggest that the Code's loss-allocation 
rules should be tested against three general principles of economic effi-
ciency: loss-spreading, loss-reduction, and 10ss-imposition.l23 Application 
of these principles initially requires an identification of the loss that tardy 
charge-back allocates. As previously noted, charge-back generally enables 
a tardy bank to shift to a consumer: (1) temporary loss, and (2) the burden 
of initiating litigation to shift ultimate 1055.124 The loss-allocation question 
raised by charge-back is thus not the ultimate one of who should bear the 
loss resulting from dishonor, but rather the more immediate one of who 
should bear temporary loss and thus the burden of initiating litigation to 
shift ultimate loss. 
In addition to the direct loss of account funds allocated to the con-
sumer through charge-back, bank tardiness may create additional indirect 
losses for the consumer who has relied on bank inaction. When a bank 
fails to alert a consumer within a reasonable time that a deposited check 
has been dishonored, the bank may induce the consumer to release funds 
or incur irreversible obligations in reliance on the bank's inaction.l2S If the 
babysitter, for example, had known several months earlier that her 
paycheck was drawn on insufficient funds, she might have confronted her 
employers before they left town, or accepted an additional babysitting job, 
or foregone the new coat or the trip to grandma's house that generated the 
credit card bill she cannot now payor the personal check she cannot now 
cover. The bank's tardiness in charging back her account deprived her of 
these and other self-help options. Such indirect loss caused by reasonable 
meetings-the Articles 3, 4 and 4A Drafting Committees were not dominated by the bank-
ing interests." Donald J. Rapson, Who is Looking Out for the Public [merest? Thoughts 
Abolll the UCC Revision Process ill the Light (And Shadoll's) of Professor Rubin's Observa-
tions, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 249, 265 (1994). In support, Rapson cites "important substan-
tive changes" that generally benefit users rother than banks, including e;>'l'ansion of the 
definition of "good faith" and recognition of a bank's dUly to exercise ordinary care in 
opening accounts. [d. at 254-55. For an analysis and critique of the process of drafting 
commercial law generally, see Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Fec/eralism, ami the 
Unifoml Laws Process: Some Lessons From the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. 
REv. 83 (1993). 
123. See generally Cooter & Rubin, supra note 111. 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93. If the underl}ing fault issue is never 
resolved, this temporary loss allocation will of course become permanent. For a discussion 
of the likelihood of this result in eases of consumer depositors, see supra notes Parts II.A-B. 
125. See, e.g., United Ky. Bank, Inc. v. Eagle Mach. Co., Inc., 644 S.W.2d 649, 649-50 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (before receiving notice that check had been dishonored, depositor 
loaded, dispatched, and delivered three truck loads of machinery to drafter in Utah): Mfrs. 
Hanover 'frust Co. v. Akpan, 398 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (depositor turned 
over $2490 to drafter in reliance on bank's implied representation that $2500 check had 
cleared). In a worst-ease-scenario for a depositor, the depository bank informs the deposi-
tor that the check is "good" before it later charges back. See. e.g., Frrst Nat'l Bank of Den-
ver v. Ulibarri, 557 P.2d 1221 (Colo. Ct. App.1976) (after being told check was paid. jeweler 
released diamond ring to drafter); Frrst Ga. Bank v. Webster, 308 S.E.2d 579, 580 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1983) (after being told check was good, depositor drew check which bank took in 
exchange for certified check). 
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consumer reliance on bank inaction is a significant potential consequence 
of bank tardiness. The losses at issue in tardy charge-back thus include 
both the direct loss of an account balance imposed on the consumer 
through charge-back and the potential for additional indirect consumer loss 
caused by bank tardiness. In assessing the efficiency of the Article 4 tardy 
charge-back rule, both these losses must be considered. 
1. Loss-Spreading 
Loss-spreading principles identify an efficient rule as one that places 
loss on the party who "can bear risk at a lower cost than another."126 Gen-
erally this party is the one with greater economic resources who is better 
positioned to spread loss effectively.127 Clearly, the Article 4 rule permit-
ting tardy charge-back was not designed to further principles of loss-
spreading since this rule places loss on consumer depositors who are usu-
ally less able to bear and to spread loss than depository banks. The loss-
spreading principle, however, cannot be dispositive of the efficiency ques-
tion since, taken alone, it would place all losses on banks rather than con-
sumers, a consequence that would surely create distorting incentives for 
both parties. 
2. Loss-Reduction 
The loss-reduction principle suggests that loss should be placed on the 
party who most cheaply can reduce loss and who, as loss-bearer, will be 
inspired to do SO.128 Such a party is one who can respond to loss-allocation 
rules, take precautions against loss, and develop innovations to prevent 
loss.129 
In the case of tardy charge-back, the narrowly focused loss-reduction 
question is: who can most efficiently avoid loss caused by banking delay in 
charging back? The obvious answer is that only a bank can avoid bank 
tardiness. Clearly, it is within the power of a depository bank to avoid its 
own tardy handling of a check. Where a bank other than the depository 
bank is responsible for the delay between deposit and charge-back, placing 
temporary loss on the depository bank would inspire all banks to develop 
procedures to insure timely action. By contrast, a consumer depositor has 
no control over the timeliness with which banks handle her check. Loss-
reduction principles thus identify a bank rather than a consumer depositor 
as the most appropriate temporary loss-bearer in cases of bank tardiness. 
126. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 111, at 71. 
127. !d. 
128. Id. at 73. 
129. !d. at 73-77; see also Rubin, supra note 107, at 568 (observing that "[b]anks design 
the [check collection] system and can avoid losses by restructuring it, training their employ-
ees, or developing new technologies"). 
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One might argue, however, that the depositor herself could have 
avoided loss altogether by declining to take the drafter's bad check, de-
manding instead cash payment, or by refusing to deal with a disreputable 
drafter or with subsequent indorsers of her check. Because these opportu-
nities allow the drafter to avoid the dishonor itself, they allow her to avoid 
all dishonor-related losses. Such reasoning supports the Code principle 
that a depositor rather than a bank generally should bear loss caused by 
dishonorpo This reasoning, however, fails to support an allocation of loss 
to the depositor in cases where bank tardiness itself creates a significant 
potential for loss in addition to that caused by dishonor of the check. By 
failing to charge back promptly after deposit, the bank has induced the 
consumer to believe that the check is good and to take action in reliance on 
the bank's implied representation to this effect. As to these potential 
losses caused by reasonable reliance on bank inaction, the bank is clearly 
the least-cost loss avoider. 
3. Loss-Imposition 
A loss-imposition principle seeks reduction of enforcement costs, the 
"deadweight loss"131 that distorts the underlying allocation of loss.132 An 
efficient enforcement scheme would thus leave losses where they fall or 
allocate loss cheaply through simple and clear rules that avoid e"""pensive 
fact _finding.133 
The Article 4 rule permitting tardy charge-back initially appears con-
sistent with loss-imposition principles as it places immediate loss upon the 
depositor of a hot check through a simple and clear rule that requires no 
fact-finding and allocates loss to the depositor at virtually no cost to the 
bank.134 This observation is not dispositive of the loss-imposition issue. 
however, since temporary loss could be allocated to a tardy bank as 
cheaply as it is allocated to a depositor. Just as charge-back is virtually 
cost-free for a bank, a prohibition of charge-back that leaves temporary 
loss with the depository bank would also be cost-free. Expensive fact-find-
ing could be avoided under such a rule by prohibiting charge-back beyond 
a specified number of days after deposit.135 
Since both charge-back and charge-back preclusion are virtually cost-
free, the focus must turn from questions of the direct costs of temporary 
130. Traditionally this principle is stated in terms of the bank's role as agent of the 
depositor. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
131. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 111, at 78. 
132. Id. at 78-80. 
133. As Professors Cooter and Rubin note, "[t]he cost of making even a single factual 
determination would quickly surpass all but the most catastrophic losses on a consumer 
account." Id. at 79. In designing rules for loss-shifting, the loss-imposition principle sug-
gests rules such as strict liability, single factor standards, objective tests, and statutory liqui-
dated damages. Id. at 78. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
135. For such a proposal, see iJlfra Part ill. 
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loss-allocation to the follow-up question of who can most cheaply bear the 
burden imposed by temporary loss-that is, those who can most cheaply 
initiate litigation to shift ultimate loss in appropriate cases. Under the Ar-
ticle 4 tardy charge-back rule, the consumer now bears this burden. Placing 
this burden on a bank rather than a consumer would likely reduce enforce-
ment costs since a bank generally can litigate more cheaply than a con-
sumer.136 Moreover, banks are generally better positioned than consumers 
to predict litigation costs and thus better able to determine whether litiga-
tion is a wise allocation of resources in view of the face value of a particular 
check.137 If tardy charge-back were prohibited, then in cases where poten-
tial litigation costs exceed potential gain, a bank rather than a consumer 
would bear ultimate loss, thus furthering principles of loss-spreading. 
Principles of loss-imposition thus are furthered by the Article 4 tardy 
charge-back rule only because financial constraints prevent consumers 
from asserting their rights.138 Consequently, consumers typically will leave 
the "temporary" charge-back loss where it falls, thus eliminating any en-
forcement costs necessary to shift ultimate loss. 
IV. 
PROTECTING BABYSITIERS: A PROPOSAL 
A code is not formulated to follow the current of decisions when 
the current is wrong, and the law ought to be changed. 139 
The Article 4 rule permitting tardy charge-back against consumers is 
wrong and ought to be changed. A more equitable and more efficient rule 
could be implemented through two simple changes to Article 4: (1) defin-
ing timeliness by reference to the date of deposit, and (2) precluding tardy 
charge-back. 
A. New Definition of Timeliness 
[TJhis Commercial Code has created an entirely new and strange 
vocabulary. 140 
The Article 4 definition of timely charge-back is counterintuitive in its 
rejection of the date of deposit as a benchmark. By instead choosing the 
136. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
137. Where potential enforcement costs exceed the check amount, a bank is positioned 
to evaluate whether precedential value warrants proceeding. 
138. As Professors Cooter and Rubin note, even a "modest fact-finding procedure 
would probably require a consumer to write a check that is substantially larger than the one 
at issue in the litigation." Cooter & Rubin, supra note 111, at 79. 
139. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Bank Collections Act and Possibility 
of Recodification of the Law on Negotiable Instmments, 9 TUL. L. REV. 378, 378 (1935) 
(quoting Amasa M. Eaton, The Negotiable Instmments Law, 2 MICH. L. REV. 260, 273 
(1904». 
140. Beutel, supra note 2, at 337. 
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date a depository bank receives notice of nonpayment as the benchmark. 
the Code definition permits charge-back to be timely long after deposit. so 
long as it promptly follows the payor bank's notice of dishonor.141 This 
Article 4 definition will likely surprise the consumer who ordinarily gauges 
the likelihood that a deposited check is good by reference to the date of 
deposit, a view encouraged by Regulation CC!42 and shared by the deposi-
tory bank under the Code's "no-news-is-good-news" collection scheme.143 
Both consumer expectation and the duty of all banks to act promptly 
in handling a check suggest that counting days since deposit can provide a 
reasonable test of timeliness. Such a definition should quantify the number 
of days within which charge-back is timely in order to allow consumers to 
rely on their bank account balances and to encourage timely handling by 
banks eager to fall within the definition's safe harbor}44 Regulation CC 
which requires a payor bank to send expeditious notice of nonpayment sug-
gests a means for measuring this period. The regulation specifies that a 
local check is returned expeditiously if it meets either of two tests: the 
forward collection test (requiring the payor bank to return a check as 
swiftly as it would have forwarded it) or the two-day/four-day test (requir-
ing the payor bank to return a local check within two banking days and 
nonlocal checks within four banking days).145 Interestingly. the Regulation 
CC commentary explains that the two-day/four-day time frame is based on 
the estimated time required to fonvard a check for payment.146 Drawing 
on this Regulation CC timetable, a reasonable time limit for charge-back 
would be six banking days from the date of deposit for local checks and ten 
banking days from the date of deposit for nonlocal checks. This period is 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
143. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 126; see also sllpra text accompanying notes 
29-31. 
144. As Donald Rapson observes, "the public interest is best served by ha\ing clear. 
concise, and efficient statutory rules so that the parties to a transaction can anticipate the 
issues and answers that may arise and guide their actions accordingly." Rapson. supra note 
122, at 257. 
145. 12 C.F.R. § 229.30(a) (2000). For purposes of the regulation. a check is local if it is 
drawn on a local paying bank. lei. § 229.2(r). A local paying bank is "a paying bank that is 
located in the same check processing region as the physical location of the branch. contrac-
tual branch, or proprietary ATM of the depository bank in which that check was deposited." 
lei. § 229.2(s). 
A definition of timeliness less generous to banks might be based on the Regulation CC 
funds availability timetable, which generally requires a depository bank to make funds avail-
able within two days after deposit for local checks and within five days after deposit for 
nonlocal checks. lei. § 229.12. Interestingly, the Regulation CC commentary suggests that 
the depository bank will often have notice of dishonor before availability is required. M. 
§ 229.30(a) (anticipating that a check will often be returned before funds must be made 
available under the temporary availability schedule). 
146. lei. § 229.30. AppendLx E to part 229 commentary states: "The times specified in 
this two-day/four-day test are based on estimated fonvard-coUection times. but take into 
account the particular difficulties that may be encountered in handling returned checks." 
lei. 
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calculated by: (1) doubling the two-day/four-day test of expeditious return 
to allow for both forwarding the check and sending any notice of dishonor; 
(2) adding one banking day within which the payor bank must determine 
whether to pay the check; and (3) adding another banking day within which 
the depository bank may charge back a depositor. As the collection system 
continues its conversion from a paper-based system to an electronic one, 
this period should be shortened significantly. Adoption of this six-day/ten-
day rule today, however, would establish the principle that charge-back 
timeliness is defined by reference to the date of deposit and would offer the 
immediate protection to consumers that equity and efficiency mandate. As 
a practical matter, however, this new definition of timeliness may have lit-
tle impact on consumer confidence or bank behavior unless it is accompa-
nied by meaningful sanctions for tardiness. 
B. A Timeliness Mandate 
All liability of the bank for improper handling of paper so carefully 
and fairly set up in the earlier drafts is removed. 147 
Under revised Article 4, delay does not deprive a bank of its right of 
charge-back, but only makes the bank theoretically liable to a depositor 
who can prove loss caused by the delay.148 Since consumer depositors are 
unlikely to initiate litigation to prove such loss, Article 4 imposes no real 
sanction against a depository bank that belatedly charges back a consumer 
account. Article 4 should be re-revised to impose a meaningful sanction 
against a tardy bank by precluding delayed charge-back. 
1. Charge-Back Preclusion 
A depository bank should be prohibited from charging back a con-
sumer account more than six banking days after deposit of a local check 
and more than ten banking days after deposit of a nonlocal check.149 Such 
charge-back preclusion would prohibit a depository bank from resorting to 
self-help to shift loss to a consumer where banking tardiness has likely oc-
curred during the collection effort.1so The timeliness directive of Article 4 
would thus become a mandate in cases of consumer deposits. 
Charge-back preclusion would not produce a windfall for the deposi-
tor "lucky" enough to avoid charge-back of a hot check. While this deposi-
tor has avoided the temporary loss of funds associated with charge-back, 
she remains vulnerable under Article 4 to a subsequent depository bank 
147. Beutel, supra note 2, at 360. 
148. See supra Part ILC.l. 
149. See supra Part lILA. 
150. The depository bank that violates this mandate should be liable for the wrongful 
dishonor of new checks the depositor draws against the improperly-depleted account. An 
additional penalty could also be imposed, perhaps a mUltiple of the face amount of the 
check. 
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action to shift ultimate loss to her. In cases presumptively involving bank 
tardiness, the essential effect of charge-back preclusion is simply to leave 
immediate loss where it falls-on the depository bank, which then bears 
the burden of initiating litigation to shift ultimate loss in appropriate 
cases. lSI 
A rule clearly defining and precluding tardy charge-back would satisfy 
the concerns of the drafters of the Article 4 official comment who sought to 
justify the general rule allowing charge-back by a negligent bank.1S2 The 
proposed rule would raise no "difficult questions" for the depository 
bank,153 which could very easily determine whether six to ten banking days 
had passed since the date of deposit. No further facts would be necessary 
to determine the right of charge-back. The date of deposit should be read-
ily available to the depository bank since this date determines when funds 
must be made available under Regulation CC.l54 
Moreover, a time-limited charge-back rule is consistent with consumer 
expectations and norms of fair play. Where bank tardiness is evident, the 
proposed rule would preclude a bank from shifting loss to a consumer who 
is thereafter financially unable to assert her right to attempt to shift loss. 
Charge-back preclusion would instead leave immediate loss and the burden 
of initiating litigation on the depository bank, which may pursue its deposi-
tor or, in an appropriate case, another bank that mishandled the check. 
2. Ultimate Loss 
Where a bank has been tardy in charging back, Article 4 places ulti-
mate loss on the bank only if the depositor can prove injury caused by bank 
delay. While charge-back preclusion places temporary loss and the burden 
of acting to shift ultimate loss on the bank rather than the depositor, it does 
not alter the Article 4 rule on ultimate loss-shifting. Revising the rules of 
temporary loss-allocation, however, provides an opportunity to rethink the 
underlying rules on ultimate loss-shifting. 
One possibility is to preclude both charge-back and ultimate loss-shift-
ing beyond the six-day/ten-day banking period after deposit.Iss The depos-
itory bank that failed to charge back \vithin its \vindow of opportunity thus 
would lose any right to shift loss to the depositor of a dishonored check. 
Such a bank would be left either to absorb the loss or to shift it to another 
151. See supra Part II.C.1-2. Such an action would resemble an action against a cus-
tomer with a zero account balance. See U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (1996) (authorizing. in addition to 
charge-back, an action by bank "to obtain refund from its customer"). 
152. See supra Part II.A. 
153. See id. 
154. 12 C.F.R §§ 229.10 to .21 (2000). The date of deposit is also critical to the deposi-
tory bank seeking to fall within the safe harbor of the Article 4 provision that a depository 
bank exercises ordinary care if it forwards a check before midnight on the day after deposit. 
See U.C.c. § 4-202(b), discussed at supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
155. For a discussion of the distinction between immediate and ultimate loss-shifting, 
see supra Part I.C. 
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bank that mishandled the check. The depository bank, for example, may 
have an action against a payor bank that delayed in sending notice of dis-
honor under either Article 41S6 or Regulation ec. IS7 The depository bank 
may also have an action against an intermediary collecting bank that 
delayed in handling the check or sending expeditious notice of dishonor. ISS 
In cases where multiple banks mishandled the check, loss may be allocated 
among them.lS9 
Such a rule of ultimate loss-allocation would have obvious appeal for 
the depositor who would know with certainty that a deposited check could 
be accessed safely once the six-day/ten-day statutory period had expired. 
Such a rule would also serve principles of economic efficiency since banks 
are better able to spread loss and to avoid delay in handling the check. 
Moreover, enforcement costs in shifting loss would be eliminated since loss 
would remain with the bank, where it falls initially upon dishonor. Fairness 
concerns, however, are less clearly furthered by imposing ultimate loss on a 
bank since banks would bear losses even where their delay caused no harm. 
Additionally, consumers might ultimately be disadvantaged by such a rule 
as banks increase consumer banking costs in order to spread loss. 
Alternatively, the current ultimate loss-allocation rule might be kept 
essentially intact with three revisions and clarifications to protect the con-
sumer depositor. Thus, a bank would retain the right to shift ultimate loss 
to the customer who was not injured by banking tardiness. This rule, how-
ever, should be changed in three ways. 
First, in any case of charge-back preclusion, a depository bank should 
be required to inform the consumer depositor in plain language of the 
bank's intent to shift ultimate loss to her and of her right to resist this effort 
by establishing actual loss caused by delayed news of dishonor. This notice 
should be sent promptly, perhaps by midnight on the banking day after the 
bank receives notice of dishonor. The notice should clearly inform the con-
sumer depositor that she can successfully resist the bank's attempt to shift 
loss to her by establishing either: (1) a lost opportunity to collect funds 
from the drafter, or (2) a release of funds or irreversible commitments un-
dertaken in reliance on a bank's failure to charge back within the six-day/ 
ten-day window. Under this revised rule, an informed depositor could pre-
vail against her bank, for example, by showing that timely notice of dis-
honor would have allowed her to recover against the drafter of the check, 
156. V.e.e. § 4-302(a)(1). 
157. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(a). A payor bank that fails to timely return a check mny be 
liable under Article 4 and Regulation CC, but not both. Id. § 229.38(b). 
158. Regulation CC requires a returning bank to return a dishonored check expedi-
tiously. Id. § 229.31(a). A bank that fails in this duty may be liable for resulting loss. Id. 
§ 229.38(a). 
159. Id. § 229.38(c). See, e.g., VSAA Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, 
906 F. Supp. 770 (D. Conn. 1995) (where check was lost for one year following dishonor, 
loss to be shared by depositor's agent and depository bank-who were 40% at fault-and 
collecting bank). 
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who has since become judgment-proof. Alternatively, the customer might 
show that she spent funds she would not have spent had she been timely 
notified that a deposited check was dishonored. 
Second, the informed depositor should be given a reasonable and inex-
pensive opportunity to claim tardiness-induced loss. The bank could pro-
vide this opportunity by sending the depositor a simple form along with 
notice of the dishonor and of the bank's intent to shift ultimate loss. 
Third, any depositor who returned the form claiming specific tardi-
ness-induced loss should receive an evidentiary advantage. Such a com-
pleted form should be sufficient to establish a prima facie defense to a 
bank's attempt to shift ultimate loss to the depositor.l60 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The Article 4 rule allowing a bank to charge back an unsuspecting 
consumer depositor's account long after deposit is unnecessary. unfair. and 
inefficient. Even where bank tardiness is evident, the rule blindly allows a 
bank to engage in a cost-free, self-help maneuver that shifts to a consumer 
the costly burden of initiating litigation to recapture account funds. The 
typical consumer who is unwilling or unable to bear this burden has no real 
opportunity to assert legitimate rights against a misbehaving bank. and loss 
thus remains where charge-back places it. 
A more equitable and efficient rule would preclude charge-back in 
cases of evident bank tardiness. A depository bank thus would be pre-
cluded from charging back more than six to ten days after deposit, a period 
drawn from the expeditious return rules of Regulation CC. Once this 
charge-back window closes, the bank would, however, retain the right to 
initiate litigation, either against its depositor or another bank. to shift ulti-
mate loss in appropriate cases. This incremental change would bring the 
Article 4 charge-back rule in line with the principles of reasonableness and 
fair play that inspire babysitters and others to trust their banks. 
160. During the drafting of the Article 4 revision, the reporters considered usc of an 
affidavit to protect the customer whose bank had paid a check contrary to her stop payment 
order. The provision would have required the bank to recredit the customer's account un-
less the customer refused to sign an affidavit setting out facts sufficient to establish a prima 
facie defense to payment on the check. See Rubin, supra note 122, at 750-51. Use of such 
an affidavit to protect consumers is not \vithout its potential pitfalls. As Gail Hillebrand of 
Consumers Union observed during the Article 4 revision, consumers may be intimidated by 
the prospect of signing a legal document and uncomfortable about their potential involve-
ment in legal proceedings. Id. at 751. 
Alternatively, a presumption of actual loss in the face amount of the check could arise 
in all cases of bank tardiness, thus placing on the bank the burden of going forward to rebut 
this presumption. See Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Prospect Nat'l Bank of Peoria. 70S 
F.2d 290, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
A final possibility would be to provide attorney fees to a consumer who prevails against 
her bank, though such a provision might create economic inefficiencies. See Rubin, sllpra 
note 11, at 32-36, 53. 
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APPENDIX 
Proposed Revision to U.CC § 4-214(a) (1996) 
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its customer 
for an item and fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of payments by a 
bank, or otherwise to receive settlement for the item which is or becomes 
final, the bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge back the 
amount of any credit given for the item to its customer's account, or obtain 
refund from its customer, whether or not it is able to return the item, only 
if by its midnight deadline or '.:vithin a longer reasonable time after it leams 
the facts it returns the item or sends notification of the facts within six 
banking days after deposit of a local check or ten banking days after de-
posit of a nonlocal check. If the return or notice is delayed beyond the 
bank's midnight deadline or a longer reasonable time after it learns the 
facts, the bank may revoke the settlement, charge back the credit, or obtain 
refund from its customer, but it is liable fur any loss resulting from the 
delay. These rights to revoke, charge back, and obtain refund terminate if 
and when a settlement for the item received by the bank is or becomes 
final. 
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